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Political repression in autocratic regimes
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Abstract
Theoretical models on autocracies have long grappled with how to char-
acterize and analyze state sponsorship of repression. Moreover, much of
the existing formal literature sees dictators’ behavior as determined by one
type of opposition actor alone and disregards the potential role played by
other types of actors. We develop a contest model of political survival with
a ruler, the elite and the opposition, and show how the ruler needs to re-
spond to revolutionary pressures while securing the allegiance of his own
supportive coalition. We find that the ruler’s reliance on vertical and hor-
izontal repression is antithetically affected by the country’s wealth and the
optimal bundle of vertical and horizontal repression has important conse-
quences for the regime’s political vulnerability. Our hypothesis about the
impact of wealth on repression is strongly borne out by the empirical re-
sults, which are robust to endogeneity concerns.
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1 Introduction
Dictatorship has been the prevalent system of governance historically and about
one third of the world’s countries are still ruled by autocrats. The lack of demo-
cratic accountability characterizing autocratic regimes does not equate to the polity
descending into chaos; instead, by carefully balancing the degree of repression
and co-optation, successful dictators manage to maintain peaceful polities that
could abruptly plunge into violence when revolutions and military coups are at-
tempted. Despite the volume of research on the strategies of autocratic regimes
(Gehlbach et al. 2016), a number of questions are still debated. Why do some
authoritarian governments favor widespread repression, while others seek to mol-
lify popular dissent by permitting a range of civil rights? Why were some regimes
betrayed by the institutions intended to protect them while in others the elite have
so far remained loyal and have prevented a transition? To help addressing these
important questions, we need to understand the rulers’ strategies to prevent and/or
mitigate the threats of popular mobilization as well as those emerging from actors
within the ruling coalition. In this article we explore dictators’ optimal strategies
of political repression, by distinguishing vertical repression (i.e. against citizens)
from horizontal repression (i.e. against elites) in settings where the ruler has the
possibility of investing in productive public goods.
In the quest to understand the strategies rulers use to stay in power, scholars
have identified divide-and-rule strategies (e.g., Verdier et al. , 2004; De Luca et al.
, 2014), power sharing and bargaining (e.g., Lizzeri & Persico, 2004; Morelli &
Rohner, 2014), or even optimal succession rules (Konrad and Skaperdas, 2007,
Konrad and Mui 2015). The biggest emphasis in the literature, however, has been
given to the cooptation-repression trade-off, whereby both elites and citizens ben-
efit from favours and are subject to repression by the central regime. Indeed,
to remain in power autocratic rulers ought to simultaneously contain two types of
threats: one stemming from the citizenry at large and that can take the form of rev-
olutions as exemplified by political upheavals in Tunisia (2011), Ukraine (2014),
or Hong Kong (2014); and another coming from the elites who can stage mili-
tary coups or provide the moral and financial support for successful revolutionary
movements.
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To contain the risk of popular revolutions, dictators invest in public goods
and in means of coercion (Wintrobe, 1998; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006; Desai
et al. , 2009; Besley & Persson, 2010; Boucekkine et al. , 2016). The typical
view is that dissatisfied citizens face coordination problems that may hamper their
capacity to successfully stage revolutions. In such settings, the quality and quan-
tity of information and communication enables citizens to better coordinate their
actions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001; Ellis & Fender, 2010; Sharmehr & Bern-
hardt, 2011; Edmond, 2013). Seldom, however, have spontaneous revolutions
been successful without the active support, or at least the consent of key ruling
elites.
Elites control the fates of the dictator, and statistically most dictators were
overthrown by members of their inner circle rather than popular uprisings; by
one estimate (i.e., Svolik, 2009), out of 303 authoritarian rulers, 205 (68 percent)
were deposed by a coup between 1945 and 2002. The elite can have incentives
to depose the ruler1 for four main reasons. First, economic or political changes
may make democracy more profitable for the elites.2 Second, elites may support
democracy as a compromise to avoid costly revolutions (Robinson & Acemoglu,
2006). Third, in anticipation of pro-democracy social movements, elites may have
incentives to depose the autocrat (Svolik, 2013; Gilli & Li, 2015). Fourth, elites
may have incentives in contesting the dictator in the hope of occupying power
themselves (Acemoglu et al. , 2010; Konrad & Skaperdas, 2007; Konrad & Mui,
forthcoming), or of obtaining more favours under another dictator (Sekeris, 2011).
From a political exchange perspective dictators usually try to buy-off the sup-
port of elites at large (North et al. , 2009; Egorov & Sonin, 2011), or more specif-
ically of economic (Montagnes & Wolton, 2016), religious (Auriol and Platteau
2016 ), or military elites (Acemoglu et al. , 2010), who all play a key role in the
regime’s stability. Cooptation serves multiple purposes all eventually consolidat-
ing the ruler’s power: buying-off the support of elites may help the ruler screen the
1We use him/his here consistently instead of gender neutral language as dictators invariably
tend to be men.
2This is because democracy, among other advantages, improves property rights protection
(Gradstein, 2007), enhances human capital accumulation (Bourguignon & Verdier, 2000), or en-
tails greater provision of public services to a fraction of the elites (Lizzeri & Persico, 2004). These
papers also give references to a fast-growing field of research, only part of which can be referred
to here.
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most ideological close supporters (Hollyer & Wantchekon, 2015), or the most pro-
ductive elites (Montagnes & Wolton, 2016), it may incentivize coopted elites to
convey less revolution-promoting information to the citizens (Guriev & Tresiman,
2015), or may reduce their willingness to openly confront the ruler via coups at-
tempts (Acemoglu et al. , 2010; Sekeris, 2011; Bove & Rivera, 2015). Since coop-
tation is costly, however, not all elites are included in the pool of beneficiaries, and
a typical tool for the dictator to adjust the size of his clientele is to use purges. The
literature on the optimal size of the ruling coalition (i.e. ruler and ruling elites)
emphasizes the role of both static (Egorov & Sonin, 2011; Montagnes & Wolton,
2016) and dynamic considerations (Acemoglu et al. , 2009, 2010, 2012; Bueno de
Mesquita & Smith, 2015; Egorov & Sonin, 2015) in the purging process. In this
article we consider a static framework.
While many political economy models of non-democracies consider two ac-
tors alone (ruler and opposition), a growing literature simultaneously considers
the two types of opposition mentioned above: the elites and the citizens (Ace-
moglu et al. , 2010; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2015). The novelty of our paper
lies in that we explicitly distinguish between the two types of repression, namely
the vertical repression (i.e. against citizens), from the horizontal repression (i.e.
against elites). Our model identifies the underlying forces explaining the optimal
mix between citizens’ coercion, purges, and public goods. On the one hand, the
elites ought to be compensated by the dictator, thus making it costly to maintain
a large body of inner supporters. On the other hand, elites are useful to the ruler
since they increase the grip of the ruler on the population, and therefore enhance
his coercive ability. The dictator is thus facing a trade-off between purging the
elites and thereby reducing their co-optation costs by having a smaller group of
supporters on the one hand, and enhancing his coercive capacity on the population
by reducing people’s collective action capacity, on the other hand.
We demonstrate that in economies that are better shielded from the harm of
conflict (i.e. more resilient), incentives to mount revolutions are heightened, and
thus dictators are eager to coopt elites, which translates in lower purges, while
also tempering revolutionary attempts by investing in public goods. This in turn
enables us to explore the relation between economic wealth and state repression,
and put forward a substantially different theoretical mechanism linking repression
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to wealth. Increasing the country’s wealth (e.g. natural resources, development
aid) incentivizes the ruler to reduce horizontal repression, while also expanding
vertical repression. As the country becomes wealthier, citizens have higher incen-
tives to oust the rent-seeking dictator. This in turn pushes the ruler to develop a
stronger military apparatus to remain in power, while also attempting to secure
a wider support from the elites, so as to reduce the citizenry’s capacity to op-
pose the central power. This finding is consistent with recent empirical studies on
repression (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005), although the theoretical mechanism
underpinning our result is substantially different from that typically mentioned in
the literature. Whereas in the latter the ruler wants to contain the level of repres-
sion to avoid dissatisfying the population too much and to preserve the capacity
to tax the population at large, in our model more wealth translates into increased
incentives for the population to mount a revolution to appropriate the riches. By
reducing the horizontal repression of the elites, the dictator improves his vertical
coercive capacity, thus improving the odds of retaining the extra riches. Interest-
ingly, in our model revolutions are the result of a deliberate choice of the dictator
not to repress the population beyond some “deterrent threshold”. Revolutions do
not therefore result from the regime’s inability to repress dissent, but rather from
his unwillingness to do so. Dictators may indeed find it profitable to sustain a
(possibly low) risk of successful revolution if this is achieved by downsizing the
body of supporting elites, thus implying economies in terms of co-optation rents
not paid to the elites.
We then use a global dataset on natural resources, human right violations and
purges, and find empirical support for these hypotheses. We focus on the archety-
pal natural resource, oil, and use two measures of wealth from newly released
datasets on oil discoveries, in addition to classical measures of oil production, to
break the classical simultaneity between violence and natural resources which has
often made it difficult to identify a causal effect of oil on human right violations.
The remaining of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 explicitly models
vertical and horizontal repression, while in Section 3 we conduct comparative stat-
ics on the amount of resources in the economy. Section 4 describes the data used
to test our hypotheses, in particular our exogenous measures of natural resource
boom, and our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our results and Section 6
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provides concluding remarks. An extension of the model that accommodates for
public good provision is deferred to Appendix B.
2 The Model
2.1 The setting
We consider a setting featuring three actors, the ruler, the elites, and the masses.
However, only the ruler and the masses are genuine actors who act strategically. In
our setup, the ruler may face a revolutionary attempt by the masses. If a revolution
is attempted, the people’s efficiency in opposing the government’s forces depends
on their cooperation capacity, which is itself influenced by the support given by
the elites to the rebellion.
The ruler who is in power manages the country’s wealth, Y assumed to be ex-
ogenous. This wealth can be used to (i) enhance vertical coercion by increasing
the state’s repressive forces through military spending r; (ii) enhance horizontal
coercion of the elites by purging a portion p of them, thus reducing the cost of elite
co-optation; (iii) invest in a public good g which increases citizens’ productivity,
and thus their labour-wage ω(g); and (iv) enrich the ruler by retaining the residual
wealth, (Y −r− (1− p)w−g), where w designates the (exogenous) per-capita bribe
paid by the ruler to the elites whose total number is normalised to 1. Disregarding
the mechanics of coordination problems among the masses, we assume that they
are represented by a single decision-maker endowed with L units of time to allo-
cate between earning a unit-wage of ω(g), and investing in revolutionary effort x.
If a revolution is attempted by the masses, their revolutionary effort, x, maps into
effective strength l ((1 − p)w) x. The function l ((1 − p)w) therefore describes the
effectiveness of a nominal amount of revolutionary effort, which depends on the
capacity of the masses to organize collectively toward the purpose of contesting
the regime. This mobilization capacity is an inverse function of the support of the
elites to the ruler: the wider the ruler’s inner circle of supporters (i.e., the lower
p) or the higher the individual payments to the elites (i.e., the higher w), the less
efficient will the masses be in opposing the regime. By purging the elites, the
ruler saves on co-optation costs, but at the same time he reduces his grip on the
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masses. We are thus assuming that the collective action capacity of the masses,
l ((1 − p)w), is a decreasing function of the total number of coopted elites (1− p).3
Moreover, we assume that the marginal effect of a larger body of elites is decreas-
ingly small. We therefore have: l
′
(.) < 0 and l
′′
(.) > 0.
In order to make the problem analytically tractable, we need to impose an
additional restriction that bears upon the shape of the relationship expressing l as
a function of (1 − p):
Assumption 1. l′ ,1−p > l,1−p
We thus assume that the elasticity of the marginal efficiency of the opposition
with respect to elite size, (1−p), is larger than the direct elasticity of this efficiency
with respect to the size of elites. This implies that the mobilisation capacity of the
masses is a decreasing and sufficiently convex function of the size of the elite
group. In other words, the dampening effect of the regime’s horizontal support on
the people’s ability to revolt must be sufficiently strong at the margin.
Lastly, we denote by φ the economy’s resilience to violence so that a share
(1 − φ) of the economy’s wealth gets destroyed if a revolution is attempted.
If no revolution is attempted, the utility of the ruler is given by the following
expression:
U = Y − (1 − p)w − r − g (1)
And the utility of the people then equals:
u = (L − x)ω(g) (2)
Under a revolutionary attempt, the utility of the ruler and the utility of the
people read, respectively, as:
V =
r
r + l ((1 − p)w) xφ (Y − (1 − p)w − r − g) (3)
3While purges are typically conceived as a tool for rulers to eliminate threats, we are viewing
the surviving purged elites as engines of the revolutionary movements. Notice also that we are
adopting a very specific approach in modeling the effect of elites’ cooptation on the likelihood of
popular revolt. Another equally important channel that has received significant weight in the liter-
ature is the informational one (Sharmehr & Bernhardt, 2011; Edmond, 2013; Guriev & Tresiman,
2015).
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v =
l ((1 − p)w) x
r + l ((1 − p)w) xφ (Y − (1 − p)w − r − g) + (L − x)ω(g) (4)
We are therefore assuming that the likelihood of either side being victorious
when a revolution is attempted is described by a standard contest success function,
augmented by the efficiency function l ((1 − p)w).4 As can be seen from these
expressions, vertical repression modifies the players’ payoffs in a direct manner
since higher levels of repression reduce the amount of unspent rents, while directly
improving the success probability of the ruler in case of a revolution. On the other
hand, horizontal repression does so indirectly since the improved relative fighting
capacity of the ruler in case of a revolutionary attempt works through the reduced
combat efficiency of the people.
The timing of the game is sequential. The autocrat first decides the levels
of horizontal and vertical repression, p and r, respectively, alongside with the
amounts of public goods, g, and then the people decide whether or not to revolt,
and how to allocate their time L between revolutionary effort x and work L − x.
We solve for the game’s subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
For expositional reasons we first treat the simplified version in which p (and
hence l ((1 − p)w)) and g, are assumed exogenous. We next solve for the model
with endogenous purges, p. The full version of model with endogenous public
goods, g, is relegated to Appendix B.
2.2 Exogenous purges p and exogenous public good g
Since we consider both the purges and the public good to be exogenous in this
section, this implies that the functions l((1 − p)w) and ω(g) will be constant, and
we therefore adopt the short notation l and ω, respectively.
In the game’s last stage, the people maximize (4) w.r.t. x subject to v(x) ≥ u(x),
which yields:
4We are therefore assuming that by choosing the amount of supporting elites, the ruler nega-
tively influences the masses’ efficiency in the contest for power, which is tantamount to allowing
the ruler to sabotage the dissenters’ capacity to oppose him. For a thorough literature on sabotage
in contests see Chowdhury & Gürtler (2015).
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lr
(r + lx)2
φ(Y − (1 − p)w − r − g) = ω
The people’s reaction function is therefore given by:
x(r) =

(
rφ(Y−(1−p)w−r−g)
lω
)1/2 − r/l if x(r) > 0
0 otherwise
(5)
As is common in the literature on contests, the people’s incentives to invest in
the revolution are an increasing function of the pie at stake φ(Y − (1− p)w− r−g),
and a decreasing cost of the (opportunity) cost ω.
Replacing (5) in (4), simplifying and collecting terms, we deduce that the
people’s utility of rebelling is given by:
v(r) =
φ
[
φ (Y − (1 − p)w − r − g)1/2 −
(
rω
l
)1/2]2
+ Lω if r < lφ
ω+lφ (Y − (1 − p)w − g)
Lω otherwise
(6)
In the first stage of the game, the autocrat decides the amount of vertical re-
pression, given the following two potential (non-dominated) strategies:
1. The deterrence strategy, which consists in repressing the revolutionary at-
tempts by deploying a sufficiently large force so that the people will not find
it optimal to contest the autocracy. We denote the corresponding deterrence
effort by rd.
2. The confrontation strategy which consists in opting for violent confronta-
tion, where power may be lost with a positive probability. We denote the
corresponding repression effort by rc.
The deterrence level is set in such a way that people are indifferent between
contesting the autocrat, and taking their exit option. We thus have that rd should
set v(r) as given by (6) equal to u(r), and this is verified when r equals:
rd =
lφ
ω + lφ
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) (7)
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The deterrent level of vertical coercion behaves as expected since it is an increas-
ing function of all the ingredients incentivizing the people to invest in higher rev-
olutionary effort i.e., the pie at stake, the people’s collective action capacity, and
the (inverse of the) people’s opportunity cost of rebelling.
Bearing (1) in mind, the utility obtained by the leader under deterrence there-
fore equals:
U∗ =
ω
ω + lφ
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) (8)
Using (3) and (5), the utility of the ruler under confrontation comes out as:
V =
(
ωrφ(Y−(1−p)w−r−g)
l
)1/2
if r <
lφ
ω + lφ
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) (9)
= Y − (1 − p)w − r − g otherwise (10)
The second possibility depicted by (10) corresponds to the deterrence strat-
egy since, to put the people at their reservation utility (= Lω), the ruler sets the
repression effort, rd, at the minimum level compatible with v(.) = u(.), which is
identical to the solution depicted by (7).
Bearing the above in mind, optimizing under the confrontation strategy yields:
rc =
Y − (1 − p)w − g
2
(11)
and the survival probability of the current autocrat at equilibrium, denoted by
pi, therefore equals:
pi =
(
ω
lφ
) 1
2
(12)
The associated condition for an interior confrontation level of vertical repres-
sion can now be written as lφ > ω, instead of r < lφ
ω+lφ (Y − (1 − p)w − g).
It is noticeable that the equilibrium level of repressive forces under the con-
frontation strategy, as given by (11) is independent of l, ϕ, and ω. The property
follows from the fact that these three arguments influence the marginal benefit of
vertical repression and its marginal cost in the same fashion. A higher resilience
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(φ), for instance, increases the incentives to repress since the pie at stake is now
increased proportionally to φ, and at the same time it increases the cost in the ex-
act same fashion since increasing repression expenditures linearly decreases the
country’s wealth. An equivalent argument applies to l and ω. This property will
prove very helpful when we analyze the more complex case discussed in the next
subsection.
We are now able to write the autocrat’s indirect utility as follows:
V∗ =
1
2
(
ωφ
l
)1/2
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) (13)
Since we know that, when lφ ≤ ω, the optimal strategy for the autocrat is
always the deterrence strategy, it remains to verify whether the alternative con-
frontation strategy can be optimal when lφ > ω. To answer that question, we must
compare V∗ with U∗ when lφ > ω. The deterrence strategy remains preferable if:
U∗ ≥ V∗ ⇔ 2
(
ωl
φ
)1/2
≥ ω + lφ (14)
Some basic algebra shows that Inequality (14) is verified for l ∈ [l(φ); l¯(φ)],
where l(φ) = ω
φ3
(
1 − (1 − φ2)1/2
)2
, and l¯(φ) = ω
φ3
(
1 + (1 − φ2)1/2
)2
. Having shown
earlier that for lφ ≤ ω only the deterrence strategy can be implemented at equi-
librium, to demonstrate that at equilibrium the ruler will pursue his confrontation
strategy it is thus sufficient to show that l¯(φ) ≥ ω/φ ≥ l(φ). The first inequal-
ity sums down to establishing that 1+(1−φ
2)1/2
φ
≥ 1, and this condition is necessarily
verified since φ ≤ 1. The first inequality is true if 1−(1−φ2)1/2
φ
≤ 1, which equally fol-
lows from φ ≤ 1. Combining these findings, we can then establish the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. When purges and public goods are exogenous, the deterrence
strategy is the preferred option of the ruler if l ≤ ω
φ3
(
1 + (1 − φ2)1/2
)2
. Otherwise
the confrontation strategy is optimal.
Proposition 1 states that the autocrat is more likely to suppress potential dis-
sent when people face large collective action problems and when the economy is
less resilient to violence. Figure 1 helps visualizing the meaning of the proposi-
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tion. On the x-axis we measure the economy’s resilience to violence, while on
the y-axis we represent the collective action ability of the masses in case of a
revolutionary attempt. The downward sloping curve l¯(φ) divides the parameter
space in two regions, with repression being the outcome below the curve, and a
revolutionary attempt above. The rectangular hyperbola lφ = ω is another down-
ward sloping curve shown in the figure, and we know that the deterrence strategy
is always obtained below it while the confrontation strategy may occur above it.
Having shown that l¯ ≥ ω
φ
, with equality in φ = 1, then any point below the l¯ curve
implies a deterrent equilibrium (shaded area). For low levels of resilience, deter-
ring the masses from attempting a revolution is cheap since, irrespective of the
revolution’s outcome, much of the contested wealth will be destroyed. Moreover,
destruction of wealth reduces the incentives for the autocrat to confront the dis-
senters, thus further inducing it to choose repression. Increasing the economy’s
resilience therefore has the double revolution-promoting effect of making the de-
terrence strategy costlier, and increasing the payoff from revolution for both the
ruler and the masses.
On the other hand, when the masses are ill-organized and face serious col-
lective action problems, while repression is cheap, the odds of quelling the rev-
olutionary attempt are high, therefore making both options attractive. When the
collective action capacity is sufficiently low (l ≤ ω/φ), if a revolution is attempted
the small security forces deployed by the autocrat under the deterrence strategy
will be sufficient to prompt the dissenters to reduce their revolutionary effort to
nothing. As a consequence, they are effectively deterred or suppressed as an op-
position movement. For higher collective action abilities, the cost of deterrence
becomes proportionally higher than the optimal expenditures required to face a
revolutionary attempt. Hence, while the probability that the autocrat remains in
control of political power gradually declines as l becomes higher, putting his po-
litical survival at risk is preferred to spending a significant part of the budget in
order to deter revolutionaries. The following corollary summarizes the findings
regarding the equilibrium survival probability of the regime.
Corollary 1. For any φ˜, there exists a unique l˜ such that for any (φ, l) <
(
φ˜, l˜
)
,
pi = 1, otherwise pi =
(
ω
lφ
)1/2
.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium outcomes with exogenous l
The proof of this Corollary follows directly from Proposition 1 which reveals
the existence of threshold values of φ and l below which the deterrence strat-
egy is the equlibrium strategy, that is, the regime is fully secure. More resilient
economies (higher values of φ) and/or more efficient revolutionary movements
(higher values of l) induce the autocrat to implement the confrontation strategy,
in which case the survival probability of the regime monotonically decreases in
both φ and l. The logic behind the effect of a change in l on pi is immediate: more
efficient revolutionary movements have better chances of ousting the ruler from
power. As for the rationale underlying the effect of a change in φ, it is as fol-
lows. On the one hand, as damages inflicted on the economy are smaller in more
resilient economies, revolutionaries are willing to invest more effort in their strug-
gle against the regime. On the other hand, the optimal confrontation effort of the
ruler is unaffected by φ because the economy’s resilience affects both the marginal
benefit and the marginal cost of confrontation in a proportional manner. We can
then deduce that, in more resilient polities that are less vulnerable to revolutionary
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attempts, the probability of winning is unambiguously higher for the masses.
Having described in a detailed manner the mechanics of the model when the
ruler can only choose the level of vertical repression, it is easier to comprehend
the more complete model with endogenous horizontal repression. We turn to this
task next.
2.3 Endogenous purges p
We now allow the ruler to equally optimally select the amount of purges, in turn
determining the people’s collective action l((1− p)w). Throughout we will use the
short notation l(p) to describe the collective action of the masses.
Under the confrontation strategy, we denote the optimal level of purges by P∗.
This level of purges is obtained by optimizing the ruler’s utility, given by (13),
with respect to p, conditional on l(P∗) > l¯(φ) (otherwise the outcome of the game
is deterrence). The unconstrained optimization yields:
w
2
(
ωφ
l(p)
)1/2 ( l′(p)(Y − (1 − p)w − g)
2l(p)
+ 1
)
= 0 (15)
In Appendix A.1, we verify that the problem is quasi-concave in p when As-
sumption 1 is satisfied. This expression implicitly defines the optimal level of
purges under the confrontation strategy, and is composed of two additive terms
(two additive terms in the bracket multiplied by factored term). The first term
(marginal cost of purges) captures the effect of increased purges on the increased
opposition capacity of the masses, which reduces the ruler’s probability of retain-
ing control of the country’s wealth. The second term (marginal benefit of purges)
captures the reduction in the pool of elites following a purge, which increases the
country’s wealth the ruler can have a claim on.
Re-arranging the above expression, the optimal level of purges under the con-
frontation strategy, P∗, is such that:
P∗ : − l
′
(P∗)(Y − (1 − P∗)w − g)
2l(P∗)
= 1 if l(P∗) > l¯(φ) (16)
P∗ : l(P∗) = l¯(φ) otherwise (17)
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To distinguish between the optimal purges under the confrontation strategy,
and the corner solution of the problem, we denote by Pˆ the level of purges satisfy-
ing (16) when disregarding the constraint. A useful lemma regarding this variable
needs to be stated here:
Lemma 1. Pˆ (and therefore l(Pˆ)) is independent of φ.
This follows from the fact that under the confrontation strategy, r is indepen-
dent of ϕ and l. This property ensures that when φ is higher the cost decreases for
both the ruler and the revolutionaries. To be more specific, V(r, x, p; φ, ω, g), as
given by (3), can be expressed as pi(r, x, p; φ, ω)φ(Y− (1− p)w−r−g). Optimizing
w.r.t. r and re-arranging, we obtain r + lx = ϕ1/2
[
rl (Y − (1 − p)w − r − g)]1/2,
which means that the aggregate strength involved in rebellion is a multiplica-
tive expression of φ. It follows that φ also enters in a multiplicative manner
in V(r, x, p; φ, ω), since V =
[
rω(Y−(1−p)w−r−g)
l
]1/2
ϕ1/2. Using the short notation
χ(r(x), p;ω, g) to designate all the elements that are independent from φ, we write
V(r(x), p; φ, ω, g) = χ(r(x), p;ω, g) · φ1/2, which implies that φ bears upon the
utility level of the agents but not upon the optimal values of either r or p.
Under deterrence by the autocrat, differentiating U∗ w.r.t. p yields the follow-
ing expression:
ωw
(ω + l(p)φ)2
(
(Y − (1 − p)w − g)l′(p)φ + ω + l(p)φ
)
(18)
This problem admits an interior optimum. In Appendix A.1, we show, indeed,
that the function is quasi concave in p, so that when (18) is satisfied with equality,
the second-order derivative is negative. The interpretation of the above expression
is the same as under the confrontation strategy: the first term captures the marginal
cost of purges (increase in the people’s collective action capacity), and the second
one (i.e. ωw(ω + l(p)φ)/(ω + l(p)φ)2) the marginal benefit of purges (reduction in
cooptation cost of elites).
Because of the additional constraint that l(p∗) ≤ l¯, the optimal level of purges
under the deterrence strategy, p∗, should satisfy:
Political repression in autocratic regimes 16
p∗ : − (Y − (1 − p
∗)w − g)l′(p∗)φ
ω + l(p∗)φ
= 1 if l(p∗) < l¯(φ) (19)
p∗ : l(p∗) = l¯(φ) otherwise (20)
As above, we designate by pˆ the unconstrained solution to (19).
To determine the equilibrium outcome of the game, in Appendix A.3, we
consider two different scenarios according to the values which l( pˆ) may take:
l(pˆ) ≤ ω, or l(pˆ) > ω.
When the parameter configuration is such that l(pˆ) ≤ ω, the unique equilib-
rium outcome for any parameter configuration compatible with this condition is
repression. When the parameter configuration is such that l(pˆ) > ω, then for low
levels of resilience, the outcome is deterrence, while for higher levels of resilience
the outcome is confrontation. For some parameter configurations, there may exist
an intermediate range of φ values such that the autocrat is indifferent between the
two strategies.
We can therefore state the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If an economy is not very resilient to violence (φ is low), rev-
olutionary movements are always suppressed (deterrence strategy). In resilient
economies (φ is high), the autocrat may choose to use the confrontation strategy.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.3.
In Figure 2 we revisit Figure 1 by allowing the level of purges to be endoge-
nous, and by assuming that l(P∗) > 1. Three curves are represented: l( pˆ), l(Pˆ),
and l¯(φ). Remember that the latter corresponds to the frontier between the do-
mains of repression and revolution, whereas the former two curves describe how
the masses’ collective action capacity evolves when the optimal level of purges
is chosen by the autocrat under the unconstrained deterrence strategy and the un-
constrained confrontation strategy, respectively.
Following Lemma 1, l(Pˆ) is a horizontal line. Two intersection points matter
for the analysis: one corresponding to the crossing of l(pˆ) and l¯(φ), and the other
to the crossing of l(Pˆ) and l¯(φ). The former intersection defines a first threshold, φ¯,
and the latter a second threshold, ¯¯φ. As explained below, these elements allow us
Political repression in autocratic regimes 17
to depict the equilibrium locus l(po(φ)) which indicates how the masses’ collective
action capacity changes as we vary parameter φ, via the effect of the optimal level
of purges po. This function is represented by the bold kinked curve.
Figure 2: Equilibrium outcomes with endogenous l: l(P∗) > 1.
From Lemma 7 (Appendix A.3) we know that φ¯ < ¯¯φ, as shown on Figure 2.
As a consequence of this, the outcome is deterrence for low levels of resilience
to violence, while the outcome is confrontation for very resilient economies (see
Appendix A.3 for the proof). The intuition behind this result is rather straightfor-
ward: incentives to mount a revolution are contained when the level of destruction
is high, and this implies that the ruler can deter such movements at reduced cost.
However, when revolutions do not affect the country’s wealth much, the support
of the elites becomes less essential, hence opening the way for more purges (i.e.,
l(P(1)) ≥ 1). Lastly, there is an intermediate range of values of the parameter φ for
which the optimal level of purges under the confrontation strategy would deter the
revolution from occurring, while the level of purges under the deterrence strategy
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would be too low to yield such an effect. As a consequence, the level of purges
of the elites is such that the autocrat is exactly indifferent between deterring a
revolution and not deterring it.
As is evident from the two figures, the optimal degree of purges decreases
(and, therefore, the masses’ collective capacity also decreases) as the economy’s
resilience, φ, increases, up to a point above which the optimal degree of purges
becomes constant.
A second corollary can now be stated concerning the equilibrium survival
probability of the ruler in the full fleged model.
Corollary 2. The equilibrium survival probability of the ruler is monotonically
decreasing in the economy’s resilience to violence.
The proof of this Corollary follows directly from a combination of Propo-
sition 2 and Equation (12). For the same reasons as for Corollary 1, more re-
silient economies tend to increase the revolutionaries’ incentives to combat the
central regime, eventually improving their odds of ousting the ruler. Alterna-
tively, economies that heavily rely on activities easily and deeply disrupted by
violent conflict will tend to create more stable authoritarian regimes.
3 Modifying the wealth of the economy
We now explore the effect of modifying the country’s wealth on the game’s equi-
librium in the specific case where the public goods are left exogenous.5
Changing the wealth level has no influence on the locus separating the oppo-
sition confrontation region from the opposition suppression region (bear in mind
that l¯ is independent of Y). Indeed, if the prize at stake, Y − (1 − p)w − g, ex-
periences an exogenous change, the incentives to deter or to confront dissenters
remain unchanged because in both cases the ruler’s equilibrium utility is linear in
the prize. On the other hand, the optimal degree of purges under both regimes is
affected by a change in Y . Rearranging (16) and applying the implicit function
theorem yields:
5See Appendix B for the analysis with endogenous public goods.
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∂Pˆ
∂Y
=
l
′
w
(
l′′(Y − (1 − Pˆ)w − g) + l′
) < 0 (21)
The sign follows from the denominator of the expression being positive, as proven
in Appendix A.1.
Proceeding likewise with (19) gives:
∂pˆ
∂Y
=
l
′
wl′′(Y − (1 − pˆ)w − g) < 0 (22)
The sign follows from the denominator of the expression being positive since
l
′′
> 0.
Lemma 2. Horizontal repression is decreasing in the country’s wealth
Regarding the optimal vertical repression levels, upon inspection of expression
(11) we can deduce that vertical repression increases with the country’s wealth
under confrontation if:
1 +
l
′
l′′ (Y − (1 − p)w − g) + l′ > 0
Using the FOC of the problem, this expression is easily shown to hold true
when Assumption 1 is satisfied.
Focusing next on the deterrence scenario, we begin by re-writing (19) as ω +
lφ = −l′φ(Y − (1− pˆ)w− g). Replacing next in rd as given by (7) yields rd = −l/l′ .
Differentiating w.r.t. Y gives us:
∂rd
∂Y
=
[
l
′
l
′ − ll′′
]
w ∂ pˆ
∂Y
(l′)2
> 0
With the sign following from the fact that the squared-bracketed term is nega-
tive because of Assumption 1.
These findings allow us to enunciate the following result:
Lemma 3. Vertical repression is increasing in the country’s wealth
Thanks to Lemma 2, we can deduce that ∂l(Pˆ)/∂Y < 0, and ∂l(pˆ)/∂Y < 0.
These two results imply, respectively, that ∂ ¯¯φ/∂Y > 0 and ∂φ¯/∂Y > 0. In Figure
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2, this means that an increase in Y is reflected in a downward shift of the curves
l(pˆ(φ)) and l(Pˆ(φ)). The locus of equilibria l(po(φ)) is thus affected in such a
way that the deterrence region is enlarged. We can therefore write the following
proposition:
Proposition 3. The wealthier an economy, the more an autocrat relies on vertical
repression, the less on horizontal repression, and he is more likely to opt for de-
terrence than for confrontation. If his power remains contested despite the higher
wealth, he is more likely to survive in power.
The first part of Proposition 3 is proven in Appendix A.4. As for the second
part, it is directly inferred from combining (21) and (22) with the fact that ∂l/∂p >
0, and ∂pi∗/∂l < 0 as deduced from (12).
The intuition behind this result is of particular interest since it sheds new light
on an old debate about the wealth-conflict nexus. When the country’s wealth, Y ,
is more important, in accordance to the greed theory (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004)
the incentives of the dissenters to mount a revolution increase, implying a greater
willingness to invest in revolutionary efforts. Under both deterrence and con-
frontation, the autocrat will respond to the emboldened rebels by increasing verti-
cal coercion. Moreover, as the opposition has become emboldened, the marginal
return to military investment has become lower than the marginal return to cutting
back on the purges, hence incentivizing the ruler to be more lenient towards the
elites whose support has now become more essential. The combination of these
two reactions on behalf of the ruler eventually implies that under the confronta-
tion strategy the survival probability of the regime is now higher. Nevertheless,
the deterrence strategy becomes comparatively more attractive. When the value of
the prize is larger, the additional forces deployed by the autocrat are increasingly
smaller because of the increasing reliance on a larger body of elites (i.e., the level
of purges diminishes) and because of the decreasing marginal returns of the rebels’
efforts in terms of the probability to win the war. The same reasoning applies to
the scenario where a revolutionary attempt is being faced. Yet, although the same
mechanism applies under both scenarios, a crucial distinction is that while in the
former scenario the ruler retains control over the whole prize increase, in the latter
this is true only in a probabilistic sense. Therefore, even though the marginal cost
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of the two moves is identical, the marginal benefit of deterrence outmatches the
marginal benefit of confrontation.
This is an important point because it invites us to revisit the resources-conflict
nexus. The initial view that has been made popular through the empirical results
of Collier & Hoeﬄer (2004) is that the presence of a larger booty induces more
conflict, a finding in line with the theoretical findings that larger stakes incen-
tivize players to fight more fiercely over the prize (see Garfinkel and Skaperdas’
(2007) literature review). These empirical findings have been contested, how-
ever, since natural resources have been shown to have a pacifying effect through
their positive effect on a country’s state capacity (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Besley
& Persson, 2011). Using more contemporaneous econometric techniques, Tsui
(2011) presents evidence that oil discoveries make countries more authoritarian,
and Cotet & Tsui (2013) demonstrate that when country fixed effects are included
in cross-country analyses, oil discoveries increase military spendings - hence pos-
sibly coercion - in non-democratic regimes, without however increasing the risk
of civil war.
By distinguishing the two types of repression at the disposal of autocratic
rulers, vertical and horizontal repression, our setup uncovers some theoretical
foundations reconciling the above seemingly contradictory findings. While an
abundant empirical literature shows that resource-poor autocratic countries are
more prone to civil conflict, no paper explores the underlying mechanisms ex-
plaining this empirical regularity. In the next section we thus test the relation
uncovered in Proposition 3 tying economic wealth to vertical and horizontal re-
pression.
4 Data and Empirical Model
Dependent variables
To empirically test our predictions regarding the effect of wealth on vertical and
horizontal repression (i.e. Proposition 3), we first need to quantify two substan-
tially different dependent variables. To measure vertical repression, one of our key
dependent variables, we use the Political Terror Scale (PTS), the “most commonly
used indicator of state violations of citizens’ physical integrity rights" (Wood &
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Gibney, 2010, p.32). The PTS uses a five level coding scheme, assessed along
three dimensions: scope i.e., the type of violence being carried out by the state
such as imprisonment, torture, killing; intensity, i.e., the frequency with which
the state employs a given type of abuse; and the range, i.e., the portion of the
population targeted for abuse.6
To capture horizontal repression, we use the number of purges taken from the
Arthur Banks Cross-National Times Series (CNTS) Data Archive. The Banks
CNTS dataset provides count data on purges and is based upon information from
the New York Times. Purges are defined as “any systematic elimination by jailing
or execution of political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposi-
tion" (Banks, 2008). True, this indicator also includes violence against opposition
outside the incumbent coalition. Yet, as far as we are aware, Banks’ data is the
only available measure of repression against the members of the incumbent regime
and it is therefore the best proxy at hand to capture rulers’ coercion against the
internal elite opposition. This measure has been extensively used in recent stud-
ies on conflict, democratization and development (e.g., Collier & Rohner, 2008;
Besley & Persson, 2011; Burke, 2012; Bank et al. , 2013).
Key explanatory variables
Our main regressor of interest is an indicator of the amount of resource wealth of
the economy. As a baseline, following previous research on the same topic, we
use per capita measures of oil exports from Feenstra et al. (2005), converted in
constant 2005 US dollar;7 and information on the value of per capita rent from oil
and gas (oil production less country-specific extraction costs) from Ross (2011).
Although models using flow variables, i.e., fuel exports or production as a per-
centage of GDP, have been so far wildly used in empirical studies of repression
(see De Mesquita & Smith, 2009; Conrad & DeMeritt, 2013), they are likely to
be contaminated by endogeneity (Bulte & Brunnschweiler, 2009): a correlation
6Another widely used indicator is the CIRI physical integrity rights index. Yet, as Wood and
Gibney (2010) point out, the CIRI index suffers from a number of limitations, such as inappropriate
categorizations of the type of violations, that make the PTS index more transparent and suitable
for our analysis. Moreover, the PTS has information from 1976, whereas the CIRI index is only
available from 1981.
7Similarly to Lei & Michaels (2014), this is constructed as the sum of exports in SITC Revision
2 categories 33 (Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials) and 34 (Gas, natural and
manufactured).
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between repression and oil flows can arise, for instance, from the extraction of
resources not being exogenous (Cotet & Tsui (2013)) or from causality running
both ways when repression affects the productivity of the economy (De Luca et
al. 2015). This makes the direction of causality between repression and resource
revenues difficult to ascertain. To circumvent this issue, we use stock variables,
in particular indicators for the known amount of oil reserves per capita (million
barrels per 1000 persons) from Cotet & Tsui (2013). Oil reserves depend on ge-
ological features and previous exploration efforts. As such, they should not be
affected by the level of political violence in a country, and hence less vulnerable
to endogeneity concerns than flow variables.
More interestingly, however, we use a number of indicators of discovery of
oil fields in a given country in a given year. The timing of oilfield discoveries
is plausibly exogenous, at least in the short-medium run, as prospecting for oil
is highly uncertain; moreover countries have little or no control over the size of
such discoveries. Therefore we use information on the amount and value of new
discoveries per capita from the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas
(ASPO), assembled by Cotet & Tsui (2013). The latter value is obtained by mul-
tiplying the amount of oil by the yearly crude oil price. To cross-check our results
on oil discoveries, we use an alternative dataset on the discovery of (at least one)
giant oil field by country and by year. Data are from Horn (2004) and have been
employed in a recent study on the effect of giant oilfield discoveries on civil wars
by Lei & Michaels (2014). Following their definition, a giant oilfield must contain
at least 500 million barrels of oil equivalent. This is possibly a more exogenous
source of variation in oil rent as finding a giant oilfield is unpredictable (see Lei
& Michaels, 2014). We look at whether the size of a giant oilfield discovery (i.e.,
the estimated ultimate recoverable reserves) in a given country/year belongs to the
first or second half of the distribution.
Other explanatory variables
We expect repression to be a negative function of the GDP, as wealthier coun-
tries are less likely to experience state-sponsored violence. Moreover, there is
robust evidence that population size increases repression (e.g., Poe & Tate, 1994).
We therefore include the GDP per capita, the GDP growth rate and the population
size using figures from Gleditsch (2002). As discussed above, political instability
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is an important factor affecting the level of repression, so that we need to control
for the presence of civil and international conflicts, using information from the
Correlates of War project; we also control for the level of popular dissent, which
is obtained by summing up the annual number of riots, anti-government protests
and strikes drawn from Banks (2008).8 Moreover, since relatively more demo-
cratic institutions are less repressive, we include the Polity IV scale (Polity, 2012).
Because we are interested in how resources affects repression in dictatorships, we
restrict our sample to countries with a Polity score < 7, following traditional stud-
ies on democratization and the conventional strategy within the democratic peace
theory (e.g., Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). Finally, we include country-specific time
trends to capture idiosyncratic variations over time, and, following similar studies
by Davenport (2007) and Conrad & DeMeritt (2013), a lagged dependent variable
to uncover inertia in a country’s use of violence and address additional tempo-
ral dynamics. We control for group-wise heteroscedasticity and serial correlation
by reporting robust standard errors clustered on countries. Our dataset includes
a maximum of 119 dictatorships over the period 1981-2003, depending on the
model, and therefore the availably of control variables. All positive and contin-
uous explanatory variables are log-transformed to scale down the variance and
reduce the effect of outliers. Table A.1 contains the summary statistics for our
sample.
As the dependent variables are categorical, we use ordered probit models with
random effects in addition to classical linear models. Note that the random effects
model yields consistent and efficient estimates under the assumption of exogeneity
of the covariates with respect to the country intercept. Yet, many covariates could
be correlated with the country intercept. To relax this assumption, and allow for
the endogeneity of the covariates with respect to the time-invariant country inter-
cept, we also estimate random effect models which include the country (cluster)
mean of the covariates a la Mundlak (1978).9 This model has many desirable fea-
8General strikes are defined as any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that
involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.
Antigovernment demonstrations account for any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people
for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or au-
thority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature. Riots refer to any violent
demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.
9The correlation between the random intercept αi and the observed characteristics xit is allowed
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tures, as it obtains consistent estimates that are not influenced by the specification
of the country intercept, while allowing for endogeneity of the covariates with
respect to the time-invariant component of the error; moreover, it controls for all
unobservable differences between countries, thus dealing with all country-specific
characteristics that may affect repression and oil wealth at the same time; yet, as
opposed to fixed effect models, it does not require us to exclude as non-informative
all countries where we do not observe variation in the dependent variable (see Ca-
ballero, 2014, for a recent application and full discussion).
5 Results
We show our results in Tables 1-4. In Tables 1 and 2 the dependent variable is
vertical repression, i.e., political terror, while in Tables 3 and 4 we use horizontal
repression, i.e., purges. Moreover, while Tables 1 and 3 include flow variables
and oil reserves, models in Tables 2 and 4 only incorporate measures of oilfield
discoveries. We use throughout the tables linear models (OLS), ordered probit
with random effect (Oprobit) and ordered probit with random effect a la Mund-
lak’s (1978). Starting with vertical repression (Tables 1 and 2), the results with
respect to country-specific variables are largely consistent with expectations and
previous studies on government repression. The level of economic development
and the annual economic performance, measured by the GDP per capita and its
growth rate respectively, are negative and significant. The size of the population is
positive. Similarly, the presence of conflicts and the level of popular mobilization
against autocrats (dissent) are shown to positively increase the level of coercion
against the population. Finally, the relative level of democracy of each country,
captured by the polity score, is negative and significant as one would expect.
As can be seen in Table 1, our analysis supports our theoretical argument that
autocratic repression against the population increases with the amount of oil and
gas rent and with the amount of oil reserves per capita, which is less likely to
be contaminated by endogeneity. Oil export is not significant. This result holds
by assuming a relationship of the form αi = x¯i′a + i with i independent of x¯i′. The unobserved
heterogeneity is divided into within and between components, which weakens the assumption that
random effects must be uncorrelated with the covariates.
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across three different model specifications, i.e., linear models, ordered probit with
random effects and ordered probit with country-means of the time-variant control
variables (Mundlak). This last specification should further mitigate the issue of
endogeneity stemming from the omission of important co-determinants of repres-
sion and oil wealth.
—————— [Table 1 in here] ——————
In Table 2 we move to even more exogenous measures of oil wealth, and use
oil discoveries and its value. Oil prices exhibit a notable fluctuation over time,
and the intuition behind our theoretical framework is that the incentives to repress
are shaped by the value of a country’s reserves rather than the quantity, which
motivates the use of the value of oil as a further test of our hypothesis. Both the
amount of oil discoveries and its value are positive and significant at conventional
levels. We also include the presence of giant oilfield discoveries, and divide it into
two groups by the size of the estimated recoverable reserves (whether it belongs
to the first or second half of the distribution). As we can see, while the occur-
rence of giant oil discoveries do not seem to matter in determining the intensity
of government repression against its citizens, the coefficient estimates for the size
of oil discoveries and it value are in the hypothesized direction and significantly
different from 0, regardless of the empirical specification. The other contextual
variables all continue to add significantly to the fit of the model in the same di-
rection. Note that the OLS models allow for direct reading of the coefficients and
that our continuous explanatory variables are log-transformed. Therefore a 50%
increase in oil reserves will increase the level of vertical repression by approxi-
mately 0.35 points. The substantive impact is overall quite sizeable, if we take
into account that the mean level of political terror is 2.8. Although we do not
rely exclusively upon the direction and statistical significance of a parameter esti-
mate, the extent of evidence for the substantive impact of oil on repression clearly
depends on model specification and data considerations.
—————— [Table 2 in here] ——————
Moving from vertical to horizontal repression, in Tables 3 and 4 the signs of
our control variables are also those expected. Our estimates are very conservative,
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and the combination of a lagged level of purges, country-specific time trends, and
random effects coupled with clusters at country level make some of the control
variables, in particular the presence of wars and the polity score, insignificant
at conventional levels. Interestingly, in Table 3 only oil export is negative and
significant, while the other oil variables fail to achieve statistical significance. Es-
tablishing a close relationship between repression and oil wealth leaves open the
question of whether “oil causes repression" or vice versa. Therefore, as we ar-
gued above, we are much less confident about flow variables such as production
and exports - given the likely presence of reverse causality - than more exogenous
measures of resource booms, in particular oil discoveries. Therefore in Table 4
we drop standard oil production variables in favor of the amount of new oil dis-
coveries and their value; they are both shown to significantly lower the intensity
of horizontal repression in autocratic regimes, as predicted by our formal model.
We then concentrate on giant oilfield discoveries, and look at possible differential
effects of discoveries according to their size (below or above the median). We
find that the effects are concentrated in the second half of the distribution. Other-
wise stated, small giant discoveries might not have as strong an effect as the very
largest giant oilfield discoveries. Finally note that while some control variables
fail to achieve statistical significance when we move to more conservative model
specifications, our results remain unaffected.
To sum up, our empirical analysis seems to point clearly and consistently to-
wards the conclusion that wealth, in particular oil, does indeed affect the level
of state sponsored repression. Yet the effect of natural resource booms on state
repression varies according to the type of target: the use of horizontal violence
against elite actors decreases with the amount of oil revenue, while vertical re-
pression, against the population, increases with the level of wealth.
—————— [Tables 4-5 in here] ——————
6 Conclusions
The use of repression is widespread among authoritarian rulers around the world,
as testified by recent events in the middle East, in Sub-Saharan Africa, or more
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recently in Turkey. To confront dissent, regimes strengthen their security (and
repressive) apparatuses, making use of imprisonment, restricting freedom of ex-
pression and civil liberties. We argue that depending on their natural wealth, au-
thoritarian regimes differ in their respective use of vertical and horizontal coercion
and terror to prevent popular uprisings. This is important since different combi-
nations of vertical and horizontal repression have different consequences for the
organization and stability of dictatorships.
We theorize that horizontal support from the elites improves the regime’s co-
ercive capacity on the population at large. Such support being costly, autocrats
have incentives in purging the elites to reduce the size of the regime’s inner circle.
We demonstrate that wealthier regimes have incentives to deploy a stronger secu-
rity apparatus to quell possible popular dissent. To improve such vertical coercive
capacity, autocrats will accordingly restrain the level of purges against the elites
so as to have a larger body of influential supporters. There is thus a double wealth
effect: when they can rely on more substantial resources to sustain them, autocrats
spend more on both direct repression of dissent and co-optation of elites. Consis-
tent with the bulk of the literature, we establish that wealthier regimes are more
stable and rely increasingly on elites to control the population.
Our empirical findings strongly support the theory. By making use a global
dataset on natural resources, human rights violations and purges, we find that oil
discoveries, and more generally authoritarian regimes that are more wealthy in
terms of oil resources, tend to contain the level of horizontal repression, while
they simultaneously resort to vertical repression to a larger extent.
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Table 1: Vertical Repression: Oil production and reserves
OLS OLS OLS Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Mundlak Mundlak Mundlak
L.Political Terror 0.646∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.024) (0.028) (0.086) (0.068) (0.081) (0.084) (0.067) (0.079)
GDP per capita (log) -0.058∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.150∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -0.572∗∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.020) (0.023) (0.082) (0.053) (0.065) (0.179) (0.115) (0.179)
GDP growth rate -0.003 -0.003∗ -0.004∗ -0.006 -0.006∗ -0.008∗ -0.006 -0.004 -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Population (log) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗ -0.406 -0.709∗∗∗ -0.991∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.034) (0.029) (0.039) (0.479) (0.231) (0.328)
War 0.522∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.051) (0.064) (0.121) (0.105) (0.135) (0.127) (0.108) (0.141)
Dissent 0.049∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023) (0.018) (0.026) (0.023) (0.018) (0.025)
Polity -0.009 -0.006∗ -0.004 -0.025∗ -0.016∗ -0.011 -0.031∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.017
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011)
Trend 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012)
Oil export (log) 0.003 -0.002 -0.006
(0.007) (0.017) (0.018)
Oil & Gas rent 0.016∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.029∗
(0.007) (0.016) (0.017)
Oil reserves (log) 0.694∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗ 1.221∗∗
(0.230) (0.625) (0.581)
Observations 1092 1786 1261 1092 1786 1261 1092 1786 1261
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Mundlak’s model is an ordered probit with country means of all time-variant covariates (not shown).
Standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country
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Table 2: Vertical Repression: Oil discoveries
OLS OLS OLS Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Mundlak Mundlak Mundlak
L.Political Terror 0.636∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.082) (0.081) (0.068) (0.079) (0.079) (0.067)
GDP per capita (log) -0.091∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗∗ -0.648∗∗∗ -0.577∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.057) (0.057) (0.046) (0.176) (0.176) (0.116)
GDP growth rate -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.009∗ -0.009∗ -0.006∗ -0.008 -0.008 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Population (log) 0.032∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ -0.974∗∗∗ -0.974∗∗∗ -0.672∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.039) (0.039) (0.030) (0.325) (0.325) (0.228)
War 0.498∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 0.859∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.051) (0.131) (0.131) (0.104) (0.140) (0.140) (0.108)
Dissent 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.018)
Polity -0.007 -0.007 -0.008∗∗ -0.017∗ -0.017∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.018∗ -0.018∗ -0.024∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Trend 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008)
Oil discoveries (log) 0.515∗∗ 1.021∗∗ 0.870∗
(0.243) (0.516) (0.513)
Value Oil disc. (log) 0.492∗∗ 0.969∗ 0.816∗
(0.234) (0.496) (0.496)
Giant discoveries 1H 0.029 -0.014 -0.004
(0.063) (0.120) (0.117)
Giant discoveries 2H 0.054 0.022 0.011
(0.066) (0.117) (0.133)
Observations 1261 1261 1786 1261 1261 1786 1261 1261 1786
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Mundlak’s model is an ordered probit with country means of all time-variant covariates (not shown).
Standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country
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Table 3: Horizontal Repression: Oil production and reserves
OLS OLS OLS Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Mundlak Mundlak Mundlak
L.Purges 0.059 0.061∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.114 0.132 0.196∗∗ 0.100 0.128 0.189∗
(0.044) (0.038) (0.046) (0.138) (0.085) (0.092) (0.141) (0.084) (0.105)
GDP per capita (log) 0.012 -0.005 -0.005 0.074 -0.145∗ -0.189∗ 0.194 -0.118 0.182
(0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.132) (0.078) (0.113) (0.338) (0.343) (0.515)
GDP growth rate 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.009 0.012 0.002 0.008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011)
Population (log) 0.022∗ 0.015∗ 0.013 0.203∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.107 -1.302 -0.919 -0.489
(0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.093) (0.072) (0.119) (1.028) (0.678) (1.112)
War 0.003 0.020 0.033 0.094 0.170 0.281 0.062 0.147 0.293
(0.016) (0.021) (0.028) (0.191) (0.171) (0.231) (0.194) (0.176) (0.255)
Dissent 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.039 0.042 0.024 0.053 0.048∗ 0.030
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.033) (0.029) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029) (0.034)
Polity -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.022 0.008 0.005 0.040 0.017 0.011
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.026) (0.018) (0.026) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029)
Trend -0.002∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.045∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.022 -0.019 -0.031
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.028)
Oil export (log) -0.007∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗
(0.003) (0.031) (0.034)
Oil & Gas rent -0.001 -0.039 -0.048
(0.002) (0.039) (0.038)
Oil reserves (log) -0.011 -0.218 0.580
(0.104) (1.763) (1.587)
Observations 1101 2013 1315 1101 2013 1315 1101 2013 1315
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Mundlak’s model is an ordered probit with country means of all time-variant covariates (not shown).
Standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country
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Table 4: Horizontal Repression: Oil discoveries
OLS OLS OLS Oprobit Oprobit Oprobit Mundlak Mundlak Mundlak
L.Purges 0.100∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.134 0.180∗ 0.179∗ 0.132
(0.045) (0.045) (0.038) (0.089) (0.089) (0.086) (0.105) (0.105) (0.088)
GDP per capita (log) -0.002 -0.002 -0.007∗ -0.133 -0.134 -0.187∗∗∗ 0.229 0.225 -0.080
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.089) (0.089) (0.066) (0.477) (0.476) (0.355)
GDP growth rate 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.008 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Population (log) 0.016 0.016 0.015∗ 0.160 0.161 0.151∗∗ -0.540 -0.534 -0.976
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.105) (0.106) (0.070) (1.120) (1.119) (0.670)
War 0.033 0.033 0.020 0.276 0.275 0.166 0.290 0.290 0.149
(0.027) (0.027) (0.021) (0.222) (0.222) (0.171) (0.245) (0.246) (0.179)
Dissent -0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.024 0.023 0.044 0.031 0.030 0.049∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.029)
Polity -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.007 0.007 0.019
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.029) (0.029) (0.021)
Trend -0.001 -0.001 -0.002∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.030 -0.017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.028) (0.028) (0.016)
Oil discoveries (log) -0.144∗ -2.625∗ -2.765∗
(0.086) (1.594) (1.664)
Value Oil disc. (log) -0.139∗ -2.537∗ -2.647∗
(0.084) (1.545) (1.623)
Giant discoveries 1H 0.013 -0.027 -0.007
(0.020) (0.168) (0.158)
Giant discoveries 2H -0.051∗∗ -4.566∗∗∗ -4.595∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.195) (0.277)
Observations 1315 1315 2013 1315 1315 2013 1315 1315 2013
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Mundlak’s model is an ordered probit with country means of all time-variant covariates (not shown).
Standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country
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A Appendix
A.1 Second order condition under revolution
Differentiating (15) w.r.t. p yields:
−w
2 (φω)1/2 l
′
(p)
4l3/2
(
l
′
(p)(Y − (1 − p)w − g)
2l(p)
+ 1
)
−w
2 (φω)1/2
2l1/2
(l
′′
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) − l′)l − l′l′(Y − (1 − p)w − g)
2l2
The first term of this expression equals zero when the FOC is satisfied, thus
implying that the objective function is quasi-concave in p if:
(l
′′
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) − l′)l − l′l′(Y − (1 − p)w − g)
2l2
> 0 (23)
Using the fact that the bracketed term in expression (15) is equal to zero, and
substituting in (23) enables us to re-write the condition as:
l
′′
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) + l′ > 0
Yet, if the FOC is satisfied, the above condition becomes:
2l
′′
l > l
′
l
′
And this last condition is verified because of Assumption 1.
A.2 Second order condition under deterrence
Differentiating (18) w.r.t. p yields:
− 2ωw
2l
′
(p)φ
(ω + l(p)φ)3
(
(Y − (1 − p)w − g)l′(p)φ + ω + l(p)φ
)
− ωw
2
(ω + l(p)φ)2
(
l
′
(p)φ − l′(p)φ + l′′(p)φ(Y − (1 − p)w − g)
)
(24)
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Whenever (18) equals zero, the first term of (24) equals zero as well, thus
implying that (24) is negative if the last expression between brackets is positive.
This is necessarily true since l
′′
(p) > 0.
A.3 Optimal degree of purges
We begin by demonstrating Lemmatas 4 to 6 that will help construct the equilib-
rium.
Lemma 4. l(Pˆ(1)) R ω⇒ l(Pˆ(1)) R l(pˆ(1)) R ω⇔ Pˆ(1) R pˆ(1)
Proof. If we set φ = 1 in (19) the expression becomes:
−l′( pˆ)(Y − (1 − pˆ)w − g) = ω + l(pˆ) (25)
Re-arranging (16) we obtain:
−l′(Pˆ)(Y − (1 − Pˆ)w − g) = 2l(Pˆ) (26)
As the shape of the expression (25) will be used in what follows, we rewrite
the expression as Ξ( pˆ) = −l′( pˆ)(Y − (1 − pˆ)w − g) − (ω + l( pˆ)), and making use
of (18) and the problem’s concavity, we therefore know that Ξ(pˆ) pˆ pˆ ≤ 0, with
Ξ(0) pˆ > 0 if an interior solution exists.
Take first the case where l(Pˆ) = ω, so that the RHS of (26) is equal to 2ω. By
comparing (25) and (26), it is immediate that if we substitute pˆ by Pˆ in (25), (25)
holds true. We therefore have that if l(Pˆ) = ω, pˆ = Pˆ is the unique solution to the
problem, since pˆ is unique.
Consider next the purges Pˆ such that l(Pˆ) < ω. Replacing Pˆ in (25), the RHS
of (25) is necessarily larger than the RHS of (26), thus implying that Ξ(Pˆ)pˆ < 0.
Because of the problem’s concavity, we deduce that pˆ < Pˆ⇒ l( pˆ) < l(Pˆ).
Proceeding likewise, we can show that l(Pˆ) > ω⇒ ω < l(Pˆ) < l( pˆ)⇔ pˆ > Pˆ.

Lemma 5. l¯(0) > l(pˆ(0))
Proof. This result follows directly from the assumption that l( pˆ(0)) is finite, while
limφ→0 l¯(φ) = ∞. 
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Lemma 6. There exists at most one φ such that l(pˆ(φ)) = l¯(φ)
Proof. To establish Lemma (6), it is sufficient to show that, whenever l(pˆ) = l¯, the
slope of l¯ is smaller (i.e., more negative) than the slope of l( pˆ). This implies that
at the crossing point, the difference between the slope of l¯ and the slope of l(pˆ)
is negative. Since the functions are continuous on the interval φ ∈ [0, 1], this is
a sufficient condition for proving that there can be at most one crossing between
the two functions. We begin by re-writing the difference between l¯ and l(p) at the
crossing point as:
ω
φ3
[
1 + (1 − φ2)1/2
]2 − l(pˆ) = 0
⇔ (1 − φ2) =
( lφ3ω
)1/2
− 1
2 = 0
⇔ −φ2 − lφ
3
ω
+ 2
l1/2φ3/2
ω1/2
= 0 (27)
⇔ K = −φ2
[
1 +
lφ
ω
− 2l
1/2
φ1/2ω1/2
]
= 0 (28)
Differentiating K w.r.t. φ gives:
∂K
∂φ
= −2φ
[
1 +
lφ
ω
− 2l
1/2
φ1/2ω1/2
]
︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
=0
−
[
lφ2
ω
+
φ1/2l1/2
ω1/2
]
+φ2l
′
wp
′
(φ)
φ
ω
+
φ2l
′
wp
′
(φ)
φ1/2l1/2ω1/2
Which implies that the sign of ∂K
∂φ
is negative if p
′
(φ) > 0. Applying the IFT
on (19) yields:
∂p∗
∂φ
= − (Y − (1 − p
∗)w − g)l′(p∗) + l(p∗)
(Y − (1 − p∗)w − g)l′′(p∗)φ (29)
Hence, the sign of ∂K
∂φ
is negative if (Y − (1 − p∗)w − g)l′(p∗) + l(p∗) < 0.
Since (19) implies that
(
(Y − (1 − p∗)w − g)l′(p∗) + l(p∗)
)
φ + ω = 0, we deduce
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that ∂K
∂φ
< 0 for any ω > 0.

We can now make use of Lemmatas 4-6 to deal with the two following possible
cases:
Case 1: l(Pˆ) ≤ ω in ϕ = 1
To show that over the entire range of admissible values for φ the ruler im-
plements the deterrence strategy, we demonstrate that the optimal level of purges
under the confrontation strategy is such that l(P∗) = l¯(φ). By the very definition of
l¯(φ), the associated level of purges leaves indifferent the ruler between both strate-
gies. Lastly, since the actual deterrence strategy dictates the choice of a different
level of purges, this must grant the ruler a higher payoff.
For the first step, from (18) we know that the interior value Pˆ is independent
of φ. Since l¯(φ) ≥ ω, ∀φ ∈ [0, 1], with strict equality in φ = 1, and since l(Pˆ) ≤ ω
by assumption, it follows that the condition in (16) is violated so that P∗ is given
by (17).
To show that l(pˆ) , l¯(φ), ∀φ, we use lemmatas 4 to 6 and conclude that (i) if
φ = 1, then l(Pˆ) ≤ ω ⇒ l(Pˆ) ≤ l(pˆ(1)) ≤ ω, (ii) if φ = 0, l¯(0) > l(pˆ(0)), and (iii)
there exists at most a single crossing point between l( pˆ(φ)) and l¯(φ). Combining
these elements enables us to conclude that for φ ∈ [0, 1], l(pˆ(φ)) ≤ l¯(φ) with
equality in φ = 1 in the specific case where l(Pˆ) = ω.
Combining Lemmatas 4 to 6 implies that, for φ ∈ [0, 1[, there can be no cross-
ing between l¯(φ) and l( pˆ(φ)), while in φ = 1, l¯(φ) ≥ l(pˆ(φ)) with strict equality for
l(p¯) = ω. We therefore have that l(pˆ(φ)) lies beneath l¯(φ) over the whole interval
φ ∈ [0, 1].
Case 2: l(Pˆ) > ω in φ = 1
By Lemma 5, the fact that l(Pˆ) > ω = l¯(1), and ∂Pˆ(φ)/∂φ = 0, there exists a
unique ¯¯φ such that l(P∗) = l¯ for φ ≤ ¯¯φ, and l(P∗) = l(Pˆ) for φ > ¯¯φ.
By Lemma 4, we know that l(pˆ(1)) > l(Pˆ(1)) > ω. Combining this with
Lemmatas 5 and 6 implies that there exists a unique φ¯ such that p∗ = pˆ for φ < φ¯,
and p∗ = l¯(p(φ))−1 for φ ≥ φ¯.
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Combining these findings, we conclude that if φ¯ < ¯¯φ, then for φ < φ¯, po =
p∗ = pˆ, for φ ∈ [φ¯, ¯¯φ[, po = l¯(p(φ))−1, and if φ ∈ [ ¯¯φ, 1], po = P∗ = Pˆ.
As a last step, we demonstrate that φ¯ < ¯¯φ is the only possible scenario by
establishing the following Lemma:
Lemma 7. φ¯ < ¯¯φ
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Assume that φ¯ > ¯¯φ. Then, there exists a
level of purges pˆ such that when pˆ simultaneously satisfies optimality conditions
(16) and (19), the resilience parameter in (16) is strictly larger than the one in (19).
Moreover, this necessarily implies that for that value of φ, U∗ < V∗. Using the
definitions of U∗ and V∗, the latter condition after simplifying reads as:
ω
ω + lφd
<
1
2
(
ωφc
l
)1/2
(30)
Using next Conditions (16) and (19), have that:
ω + lφd + φdl
′
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) = 0 = 2l + l′(Y − (1 − p)w − g)
Rearranging yields:
ω + lφd = 2lφd
Replacing in (30) yields
(lφc)1/2 φd > ω1/2
Since under the deterrence strategy, we have that pi =
(
ω
lφ
)1/2
= 1, the previous
expression sums down to:
φcφd > 1
And this is impossible. 
Lemma 7 implies that only the case where φ¯ < ¯¯φ needs to be considered, and
this completes the proof.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. By Lemma 7 we know that φ¯ < ¯¯φ. From a simple look at Figure 2a it is
evident that (i) the range of φ parameters for which OSS is used is enlarged when
Y increases, and the curves l( pˆ) and l(Pˆ) shift downwards as a consequence, and
that (ii) the range of φ parameters for which a revolutionary attempt is not deterred
is correspondingly narrowing. 
B Endogenous public good provision
B.1 Optimality
We now consider the case where in the game’s first stage, besides optimizing for r
and p, the ruler equally optimally chooses g, given that ω(p)
′
> 0 and ω(p)
′′
< 0.
Confrontation strategy
Under the confrontation strategy the ruler maximizes the following problem:
max
g
V(r(g), p(g), x(g)) = max
g
{
ω(g)
ω(g) + l(p)φ
(Y − (1 − p)ω(g) − g)
}
(31)
Optimizing and making use of the Envelope theorem yields:
∂V(r(g), p(g), x(g))
∂g
=
φ1/2
2l1/2
[
ω(g)
′
2ω(g)1/2
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) − ω(g)1/2
]
(32)
For the problem to admit a (unique) interior optimal level of public goods, it
is sufficient to demonstrate that the following second-order condition holds true:
ω(g)
′′
2ω1/2
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) − ω(g)
′
2ω3/2
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) − ω(g)
′
2ω1/2
≤ 0 (33)
Using the capital letter G∗ to describe the optimal value of public goods under
the confrontation strategy, can therefore conclude from (32) that the following
expression implicitly characterizes G∗:
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ω(G∗) =
ω(G∗)
′
2
(Y − (1 − p)w −G∗) (34)
Deterrence strategy
Under the deterrence strategy the ruler maximizes the following problem:
max
g
ω(g)
ω(g) + lφ
(Y − (1 − p)w − g) (35)
Denoting by g∗ the optimal, the associated first-order condition which implic-
itly defines g∗ reads as:
ω(g∗)
′
lφ
ω(g∗) + lφ
(Y − (1 − p)w − g∗) − ω(g∗) = 0 (36)
And the second-order condition can easily be shown to hold.
B.2 Effect of public goods on horizontal repression
As before we consider sequentially the effects under the confrontation and under
the deterrence strategies:
Confrontation strategy
Applying the implicit functions’ theorem to (16), we obtain:
∂Pˆ
∂g
= − l
′
w(l′′(Y − (1 − p)w − g) + l′) > 0
Deterrence strategy
Applying the implicit functions’ theorem to (19), we obtain:
∂pˆ
∂g
=
ω
′ − l′φ
wl′′(Y − (1 − p)w − g) > 0
We thus conclude that the introduction of public goods in the model increases
the equilibrium horizontal repression.
B.3 Effect of public goods on vertical repression
Considering once more the two strategies of the ruler, we analyze the effect of
public goods on vertical repression:
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Confrontation strategy
Using (11) we obtain:
∂rc
∂g
= −1
2
− l
′
2(lll(Y − (1 − Pˆ)w − g) + l′)
We thus obtain:
∂rc
∂g
< 0⇔ − l
′
(lll(Y − (1 − Pˆ)w − g) + l′) < 1
⇔ l′′(Y − (1 − Pˆ)w − g) + 2l′ > 0
Using the optimality condition for Pˆ, this condition reads as:
2llll > (l
′
)2
And this condition is satisfied following Assumption 1.
Deterrence strategy Proceeding likewise with (7), we obtain:
∂rd
∂g
= − l
′
φω(g)w∂ pˆ(g)/∂g + lφω(g)
′
(ω(g) + lφ)2
(Y − (1 − pˆ)w − g)+ lφ
ω(g) + lφ
(
pˆ(g)
′
w − 1
)
< 0
We thus conclude that the introduction of public goods in the model reduces
the equilibrium vertical repression.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Political Terror 2.8 1.1 1 5 2346
Purges 0.2 0.9 0 34 4636
Oil export (log) 2.2 3.9 -8.8 10.9 2441
Oil and Gas rent 2 2.8 0 11.3 4270
Oil reserves (log) -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 3319
Oil discoveries (log) -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 3319
Value Oil disc. (log) -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 3319
Giant discoveries 1H 0 0.2 0 1 5487
Giant discoveries 2H 0 0.1 0 1 5487
GDP per capita (log) 8 1 5 11.5 4335
GDP growth rate 2 8.9 -65 131.2 4254
Population (log) 8.9 1.5 4.8 14.1 4768
War 0.1 0.4 0 1 2492
Dissent 0.9 2.3 0 41 4636
Polity -4.3 4.9 -10 6 5487
Trend 34.4 17.1 1 64 5487
